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INTRODUCTION
Inthe typical urban area, decisions by local governments,
households, and housing suppliers are highly interrelated.
The reason for much of this interdependence is that space
is the principal basis for defining local public-sector jurisdictions.
Most metropolitan areas are composed of many jurisdictions, each of
which provides services and levies taxes on its own inhabitants. Local
jurisdictionsalsotypically control zoning and the issuance of
building permits. These public-sector decisions affect the prices of
land and housing and are a factor in determining who will choose to
move into the zone. Housing and land prices together with zoning
rules influence the nature of new development. At the same time, the
price and quality of housing available in a jurisdiction will be factors
in determining who will choose to reside there and, hence, the vote
on public-sector decisions. Housing market outcomes and local
public-sector decisions are thus highly interdependent.
In any model of public-sector decisions, housing stocks must play
a prominent role. Housing stocks differ substantially across jurisdic-
tions, and the time lags involved in changing the existing stock are
relatively long. In jurisdictions with little vacant land for develop-
ment, an area's housing stock may undergo relatively little change
over time as long as prices remain above the level required to
encourage normal maintenance. Even relative to other areas, the age
and quality of a zone's housing may change only very slowly. Given
the preferences of certain types of households for particular kinds of
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housing, variations in housing stocks among zones can be a useful
of the income and lifecycle of the neighborhood's
residents(Straszheim 1975). The limited empirical evidence on
consumer preferences for public-sector outputs indicates that prefer-
ences are related to incomes and life cycle as well (Hirsch 1970;
Borcherding and Deacon 1972). This suggests that differences in
public sector actions from zone to zone and over time are likely
closely related to the types of housing stocks available and their
changes.
The theoretical literature has stressed the advantages of a system
of multiple jurisdictions with different tax and service levels in each.
To the extent that there are differences among households in income
or tastes which affect the demand for government services, there is
an obvious incentive for households to stratify into "homogeneous"
jurisdictions according to their preferences for a smaller or greater
role for the public sector.It has been shown that an efficient
outcome will require that there be such differences (Tiebout 1956;
McGuire 1974). Specifying voting procedures, zoning rules, and
taxing instruments that will secure an efficient solution is more
complex; it seems likely that customary voting and taxing instru-
ments will not produce such a result (Buchanan and Goetz 1972.).
In the typical metropolitan area there will not likely be sufficient
jurisdictional fragmentation so that all residents in a zone will be in
common agreement on the public sector budget and associated taxes.
First, the number of jurisdictions is typically limited. In some urban
areas there may exist only a few large jurisdictions, while in others
the number may be substantially larger. Scale economies limit the
extent to which jurisdictions can be reduced in size. In addition,
externalities increase with reduction in size, much complicating the
determination of efficient public-sector actions and limiting the
opportunity to decentralize decision making. Certain income redis-
tribution objectives can also be achieved by limiting the number of
jurisdictions. (And state legislatures may consider other objectives as
well.)
Housing stocks also typically vary within jurisdictions because
housing units are often constructed over an extended period of time
during which prices for housing, land, and construction vary. Thus,
while variation in tastes for public services and housing can likely
best be described by a continuous probability distribution with a
positive covariance between housing and public-service preferences,
the latter must be matched against a finite set of residential zones,
each of which contains a fixed and heterogeneous housing stock.
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aspatial configuration of households matching the existing set of
housing stocks which will yield unanimity on public-sector voting in
each jurisdiction.
There may also be variation in preferences for public services
within a zone that cannot be traced to differences in housing
consumption. Households may have moved into a zone on the basis
of faulty expectations about public-sector outputs or tax burdens.
Also, because of relocation costs and other factors—for example, job
location—that restrict residential mobility, some households may
find themselves in a jurisdiction in which their preferences for
public-sector outputs differ from those of their neighbors, though
they all have identical housing units.
Relatively little attention has been devoted in the literature to the
specification of difference among voters. In this study I discuss
procedures for explicitly modeling the relationships between fixed
housing stocks, variations in income and preferences across house-
holds, and local-governm?nt decisions. The principal issue addressed
is the decision-making process of jurisdictions with heterogeneous
interests, in large part arising from a fixed stock of housing which
itself is hetereogeneous.
The general procedure outlined below is to represent differences in
preferences parametrically, relating differences in how households in
any jurisdiction vote on public-sector decisions to differences in
housing stocks or underlying utility functions. This uses the tech-
nique of change of variable, in which probability density functions
on housing stocks or tastes are translated into a density function
describing voting preferences. The housing stock is regarded as fixed
at a point in time. Decisions on current-period services and taxes and
on zoning are analyzed; the latter affect future votes, tax burdens,
and housing prices, all of which are important to the welfare of
existing residents.
The analytic procedure using change of variable is quite general.
For a variety of assumptions regarding initial probability distribu-
tions and change of variable, the resultant density function describ-
ing voting outcomes will be continuous. However, as in most
change-of-variable problems, the class of problems that can be solved
analytically is relatively small. Further development of these models
is likely to involve numerical evaluation. The discussion in this
chapter is focused primarily on the issues involved in the specifica-
tion of the models rather than in their numerical solution and is
intended to highlight the advantages and disadvantages of this general
approach. Illustrative examples are presented.
In several important respects the models are partial equilibrium
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r
ones. The analysis focuses only on how decisions are made in one
zone, taking all events "outside" the zone as given. "Competitive"
behavior or the perceived "mutual dependence" between jurisdic-
tions and itseffects on decisions by each jurisdiction are not
addressed.
Household locations are exogenous to the models. The models
describing preferences of existing residents imply a variety of
different aasumptions regarding how the household's locational
decision might be formulated. These are spelled out below. Neither
the relocation decision nor the problem of matching households to
available housing stocks in particular jurisdictions is addressed in this
study.
I also describe the basic change-of-variable approach. Applications
of the model are based on particular assumptions regarding the
factors that generate the underlying distribution of residents' prefer-
ences for public-sector decisions. In conclusion I review the insights
derived from the models in this study as. they relate to the more
general problem of modeling public-sector-housing market inter-
actions.
REPRESENTINGVARIATIONS IN VOTER PREFERENCES
BY CHANGE OF VARIABLE
Inmost general terms, variationin housing consumed andutility
functionsmight be represented by a probability density function,
f(h, A), where h denotes housing; and A, a vector of parameters
describingpreferences. For example, Amight include the number and
age of children in the household, the age of head of household, etc.
Let A have n —1elements. Assume that households' preferences for
public-sector outputs,are related to h and A as follows:
g1=d1(h,A);i=l,.. .,n (2-1)
The elements g. are themselves random variables, a transformation of
h and A, whose density function is given by change of variable.
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arid that the transformation is one to one. (This is guaranteed locally
if the partial derivatives are continuous at the point of interest and if
the Jacobian does not change sign.) The density function
describing households' preferences for g is given by:




In the models analyzed below, the public.sector decisions being
voted upon are assumed to be one-dimensional. To derive the density
function for g (where g is now assumed to be one-dimensional) on
the basis of the transformation from (h, A) to g, n —1"dummy"
variables must be defined; the latter are then integrated out to get
the marginal density function on g. Letdenote n —1dummy
variables, related to handA as follows:
..n (2-4)
The specification of z1 is dictated solely by analytic convenience.
Integrating out the yieldsthe density function for g:





This provides a flexible analytic procedure for representing variation
in tastes.
The density function G(g) describes the degree of heterogeneity
among voters. A variety of assumptions might be employed to
determine how these differences in opinion over g are reconciled. For
example, the probability that anyone votes might be related to
preferences for g and could be readily incorporated once the density
function is known. In most of the models below it is assumed that
voting outcomes reflect preferences of the "median" vote. Thi
simple rule has considerable appeal when a simple issue is being voted
on, or preferences are single-peaked (Barr and Davis 1966; Bowen
1943; Comanor 1974). (The complexities of multi-dimensional pub-
lic-sector decisions would be treated by a straightforward extension
of the change-in-variable model describing preferences. However, the
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interpretationof voting results is much more complex when several
issues are being voted on in a single election.)
The nature of available housing in any jurisdiction can be easily
determined (e.g., from census data or household interview surveys
taken in transportation planning studies). Specifying models that
describe the variation in tastes of residents at any point in time and
the relationships between h, A, and voter preferences for g is more
complex.
•The simplest approach would be based on customary demand
functions, and would assume a direct relationship for g in terms of
housing consumed, tastes, and the price of public services, without
tracing the relationship between g and those parameters to under-
lying utility functions or to the way households form expectations
when they chose to reside in any zone. This has the advantage that
existing empirical studies may be useful in specifying the relevant
parameters.
In the models below it is assumed that the public-sector budget
must be balanced in each jurisdiction. While there are many possible
taxing policies, two important special cases are a head tax (a constant
charge per household) and a property tax. The latter is assumed to be
assessed on housing values in nondiscriminatory fashion, with each
household's tax bifi directly related to the size of h. Assume housing
prices are proportional to h and that public services are provided by a
linear cost function:
C(g, N) =Nj3g (2-6)
where C(g, N) =costof providing public sector output g to the N
citizens in the jurisdiction, and f3 =costper unit of g
per person.
Balancing the public-sector budget implies that the tax bill for public
services will vary with house size:
f3gN= tPh fhf(h)dh (2-7)
where ttax rate, and= priceof housing. Thus
(2.8)
where.t= meanhouse size in jurisdiction. Hence, the unit price of
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Thesimplest demand model is based on the assumption of a linear
relationship between housing, public service prices, and households'
preferred choice of public-sector output. Assume the demand equa-
tion as follows:
g0 =a0+a1h+ a2Pg(h) (2-9)
where a1 > 0, a2 < 0. If Pg(h) is based on a property tax, Equation
(2-9) will be linear in g and h:
(2-10)
Depending on the form of f(h), a linear transformation from h to g
may much simplify the determination of G(g0). If f(h) is normal,
G(g0) will also be normal, the mean and median will coincide, and
the voting outcome can be easily solved analytically. [Since h cannot
be negative, the assumption that h is normal is only an approxima-
tion; however, normality would provide a good approximation to the
shape of f(h) for most jurisdictions.]
This simple demand model formulation implies a common utility
function with variationin preferences for g traceable only to
variations in housing. Introduction of variation in tastes complicates
the specifications. The simplest way is to assume that a0 is a random
variable described by a probability distribution, [(a0). If a0 and h are
normally and independently distributed, the density function for g
will be normal, and can be readily described. In the more general case
in which a0 and h are independent (continuous) random variables,
the density of their sum can also be relatively easily determined. In
the case above, let f1(a0) and f2(h) be the density functions. Define
a dummy variable z =[a1+ a2 (j3/p)1h.The Jacobian (J) of the
transformation from (a0, h) to (g1, Z) is given by:
1 —1 (2-11)
=














34 Residential Location and Housing Choice
prevailingg. (This
unanimity in a v












x in income, Y a'
and the density function foris given by integrating out z:
00
(3 •O—1
f[(g—a0)I(z+ a2 —), z] (z +—)dz (2-13)
Thiswill likely require numerical evaluation for virtually any specifi-
cation of f(h, a1) that is not a uniform distribution.
These voting models based on customary demand functions are
flexible and may approach the limits of our knowledge about
preferences for public-sector outputs. The more challenging specifica-
tion is to relate current residents' preferences to underlying utility
functions, and to the reasons why households chose any given zone
(and have chosen to remain). This approach implicitly introduces a
host of questions as to how households form expectations regarding
the level of public services and taxes in the chosen zone relative to
other options at the time of their move. In the next section, several
classes of models are developed in which voter preferences for g are
related to underlying utility functions and different assumptions
regarding expectations.
SPECIFICATIONOF THE SOURCES OF VARIATION IN
PREFERENCES FOR PUBLIC SERVICES
PerfectForesight: Variation in Utility Functions
Inone class of models it is assumed that households have perfect
foresight, correctly anticipating the level of g voted in the zone. If it
is further assumed that there is continuous variation in g across
zones, so that all households can pick a zone with just the g they
prefer, all residents in a zone will be in unanimous support of the
In the case where other terms in the formula for g are random
variables, e.g., a1 or a2, obtaining the density function for g is
slightly more complex. For example, suppose a1, the coefficient on
h, is also a random variable, and the joint distribution of (h, a1) can
be described by the density function f(h, a1). In this case let the
dummy variable zbedefined equal to a1. The Jacobian of the
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prevailing g. (This also assumes costless relocation.) This model yields
unanimity in a vote on g in any jurisdiction. Since households in a
given zone all receive the same g, the variation in utility functions
among residents (necessary to yield unanimity on g) can be derived
from the observed variation in the existing housing stock.
Describing this variation in preferences is most easily handled by
assuming a common utility function, with certain parameters allowed
to vary across households. Let the utility function for households be
denoted by U(h, g, x, A), where g =public-sectoroutput, h =
housing,x =allother goods, and A =parameterdenoting household
tastes, which vary across households according to a known probabil-
ity distribution (Ais assumed to be one-dimensional, for ease of
exposition). Utility maximization yields three equations for h, g, and





The solution of the demand equation for housing in terms of income
is Yd(h, p, A); substituting the latter into the demand equation for
g yields an expression for g in terms of h, p, and A:
g0 = (2-15)
Since all households locating in a zone correctly anticipate the
prevailing g and face the same prices, expression (2-15) amounts to a
one-to-one transformation from h into A. This transformation is the
basis for deriving the variation in utility functions for the density
function for h. The usefulness of this class of models is in describing
how the vote on g varies among jurisdictions with different housing
stocks.
DifferingExpectations: A Common Utility Function
Analternative class of models that do not yield unanimity on the
level of g is based on the assumption that tastes are identical across
households, but that households formed differing expectations on g
when they chose to buy h in the zone. Assuming h and g are
complements, those households that purchased large houses expected
a large g to be voted. Observed differences in housing are therefore a
proxy for differences in ex-ante expectations. The vote on g reveals36 Residential Location and Housing Choice
thedifferences of opinion. In this case some households will be
disappointed (and the question of whether this will encourage exit is
raised—an issue not dealt with in this study). For present purposes it
will be assumed that current residents are momentarily captive.
A special case of this approach is the assumption that households
enter the zone expecting to get precisely the g they prefer when
confronted with the prevailing prices for g and h.Underthis
assumption, demands for g and hcanbe represented by the standard
first-order utility maximization conditions with respect to g, h,and
x. In this case the only source of variation in preferences for g as a
function of h, A, and p (Equation (2-15)) in any jurisdiction can be
related to differences among residents of a zone in their consumption
of h. Variation in preferences for g depends only on the density
function for h, f(h), and the form of the utility function.
The following illustrates this class of models, assuming public
services are financed by a "head" tax, defined as a constant charge
on each dwelling unit regardless of its size. The budget constraint is
linear with a head tax. The tractability of the results depends on the
choice of a utility function and the nature of f(h).
To illustrate, assume households have a Stone-Geary utility func-
tion:
U =a1in (g —b1)+a2in (h —b2)+a3in (x —1)3)
which is maximized subject to a budget constraint:
Y=PXX+Phh +Pgg
where P is the tax levied on each household, and is invariant to h.
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that the g they prefer wifi also result. Using the demand relationship
between h and Y, a solution for Y in terms of h can be substituted
into the demand equation for g, yielding an equation in h and prices.






Since hb2, (2-17)is always positive. Since it is a linear expression
in g and h, the density function for g0, G(g0), is
dP
G(g0) = f(h) (2-18)
liz
In the case where f(h)isnormal, g0 will also be normal. The mean
(and median) of g0 is b1 —(dlPh/d2Pg)b2 +(dlPhld2Pg).i.The
variance of g0 (as one possible measure of the variation in voter
preferences) is (dlPh/d2Pg)(Again, this is only an approxima-
tion, since hcanassume negative values ifitis normal but is
constrained to be bythe utility maximization model.) The
voting outcome foris thus linear in p -Theelasticity of the g0
chosen with respect to p is (d1 )(pig°),which exceeds 1.0
for small pandtends toward 1.0 in the limit asp rises. Interpretation
of this elasticity is relatively straightforward: dandd2 are the
marginal propensities to consume g and hrespectively.As d1/d2 is
increased, the elasticity is increased at each level of h. Comparisons
across zones are straightforward, since the relationship between the
median of g0 and p is linear.
Under the assumptions of a nondiscriminatory property tax, the
results of a voting equilibrium with this type of model are much less
tractable. Assume households maximize a utility function U(g, h, x),
subject to the budget constraint:
0
The first-order conditions are as follows, where subscripts on U
denotepaEtial derivatives:
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Ug= 13h (2-19)
preferences for g
+ (3g term in the expressi
Uh—h
h a
The nonlinearity in the budget contraint arising from introduction of Solving for Y inten a property tax results in far more complicated expressions for voting
equilibrium.
1 To illustrate the simplest case, consider the utility function U =ag y =—
+bh + c in x.(A linear function in all arguments is unsatisfactory
since this results in corner solutions, with the household consuming




where D1,D2,D3, Substituting for x yields an expression with the product term hg: involve multiple sol
The latter must
Phh/lh —j3hg= + $g) (2-21) largest valueis n
problem. The app
only the positive Since g is linear in h in this case, i.e., g =(b/a)h—(Pp/13),quadratic transformation is demand equations for h or g in terms of Y and prices result, as eliminating any h
follows: density function G(
f3b c cf3 c
——h2 +—)h =0 (2-22)
G(g0)=, a b a
a
+ —-——) = 0 (2-23)




Ineach case the positive root gives the appropriate solution for h and fromhto g0 is ur
g. transformation is c
To determine how households with different housing stocks will will be defined by vote, expression (2-22) for h is substituted for Y in the demand The voting equilibri equation (2-23) for g. This yields an expression showing how voting for h equal to me'Decisions and the Urban Housing Market 39
(2-19) preferences for g arerelatedto housing stocks. Y appears in only one
term in the expression for g0.
cb cP 2
h a a
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Ilityfunction Uag y =—
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+ — 1 (2-25)
tits is unsatisfactory a
12 a b
pusehold consuming Substituting in (2-24) yields g0 as a function of /iinthe following
for UhIUX form:
g0 =D1 +(D2h2+D3h (2-26)
(2-20)
Foduct term hg: where D1, D2, D3, and are constants. Equation (2-26) may
involve multiple solutions for g in terms of h, or negative solutions.
The latter must be excluded; of the positive solutions, only the
(2-21) largest valueisrelevant to the household utility maximization
problem. The appropriate transformation therefore must include
only the positive value of the square root term defining g0. This
(Pp/j3), quadratic transformation is complex, as is the Jacobian appearing in G(g0),
pd prices result, as eliminating any hope of ready interpretation of the probability
density function G(g0).
(2-22) 8(g0—D1)
G(g0)= 1/2 f(h) (2-27)
+4D2(g0—D1)]2
(2-23) Since G(g0) is not a recognizable density function, its properties
can only be examined numerically. However, it is possible to make
certain inferences about the voting equilibrium. If the transformation
solution for h and from h to g0 is unique and monotonic over the range of f(h), the
ousing stocks will
transformation is order preserving, and hence the median of G(g0)
Y in the demand will be defined by the g preferred by the household with median h.
The voting equilibrium can therefore be determined by solving (2-14)
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that dg0/dY and dY/dh> 0; hence dg0 /dh will be positive through-
out the range of h, and the transformation will be order preserving.
For the household with median h =.j.z,the expression for Y in terms
of h becomes:
b C C CPh f3
Y =—+ —— (c+ (2-28)
a b a ba
Substituting into (2-24) yields:





The example above is the simplest case I have found. For example,
the Stone-Geary utility function yields equations in higher powers of
g when a property tax is employed. In general, models relating votes
on g to housing stocks tend to involve rather complex transforma-
tions when utility functions are employed. These more complex
density functions in g0 wifi require numerical evaluation.
OtherSourcesofVariation in Tastes
Inboth of the above models, variation in preferences for g could
be fully described by the marginal distributions for either h or X. One
broad class of models contains variation in residents' preferences
independent of variation in available housing stocks. The discussion
below indicates some of the issues in specifying such models. Often
they implicitly involve the household location decision and why the
reasons for the household's choice of zone.
Although preferences for g are likely to vary continuously over a
wide range, only a relatively small number of jurisdictions are
ordinarily available to choose from, and thisrestrictionis an
important source of variation in tastes independent of the amount of
housing consumed. Under these circumstances, preferences in any
one zone will not be completely homogeneous, even though house-
holds stratify according to their preferences for g, as Tiebout and
McGuire outline. Under their assumption, differences in preferences
for g would exist within each zone even if all housing in every zone
kPub/ic-Sector Decisions and the Urban Housing Market 41
werethe same. As the number of available jurisdictions is increased
(or the underlying variation in utility functions is reduced), hetero-
geneity of tastes in each jurisdiction will be reduced.
A second source of variation in tastes arises from relocation costs.
As relocation costs increase, households are more likely to find
themselves in a jurisdiction in which public-sector decisions are not
those they prefer. As residential composition, incomes, and tastes
change over time, voting outcomes wifi vary as well. At any point in
time, higher relocation costs imply greater variation in tastes among
residents.
A third case arises from differences among households in their
expectations regarding g prior to their move into a zone. The model
described in which variation in housing consumed, h, represents
variation in preferences, was a special case. Clearly, there may be
many different bases for households' formation of expectations
regarding g.
ZONINGDECISIONS
Inaddition to determining government services and tax levels in a
jurisdiction, its members make important decisions that affect the
type of development of the zone. Zoning rules on minimum sizes for
lots and structures, permissible amounts of rental property, and the
nature of nonresidential development all may have important effects
on the type of new construction undertaken, and hence, on the
socioeconomic characteristics of incoming residents.
To describe how residents make decisions about zoning, several
components of the housing development process must be described.
Zoning rules affect the financial returns to various types of develop-
ments; with some time lag, development will occur in response to
profit opportunities. The type of new housing in turn will influence
the preferences of future residents for public services, and will affect
tax burdens for all residents.
In the model below, the relationship between particular zoning
rules and the rate or type of new construction is assumed to be
exogenous. It is assumed that current residents can predict how any
zoning rule will alter the course of new development. Only two time
periods are considered, the present and the future. Current residents
choose a zoning strategy that maximizes their welfare by majority
vote, and with no influence exerted by developers or other interested
parties.
The utility maximization decision for current residentsisto
choose that zwhichleads to a future g and an associated tax bifi
through-
order preserving.
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whichmaximizes current residents' welfare. Formulation of the
voting outcome on a zoning policy is again a problem in change of
variable. However, in this case two transformations must be consid-
ered. Let f5(h')denote the future housing stock, conditional on
zoning policy z; g'(z)isthe outcome of the vote on g in the future;
and g'Pg(h) = is the tax bill for future government service
g' to a future resident household with housing h. (The primes on g
andhdenote future outcomes.) To describe current residents'
preferences for zoning strategies, z, requires that current voters
predict future votes on g. Those predicted future votes, conditional
on the current zoning decision, determine the level of g and tax
burdens in the future. Thus, describing the outcome of the vote of
current residents on zoning requires that future voting outcomes be
predicted for each possible zoning decision, each of which involves a
change..of-variable problem.
Two financing alternatives were considered in the previous sec-
tion:a head tax and a housing property tax. The former is
uninteresting for present purposes since its use removes all considera-
tions of differential tax burdens; the objective of current residents
would be to select that zoning strategy which results in entry by
households who will vote for a level of g in the future identical with
the preferences of current residents. The median voter today would
in essence control the zoning outcome, and entry over time would
therefore result in increasingly greater neighborhood homogeneity.
The case of property tax financing is more interesting. Here, a
zoning policy that alters the distribution of housing stocks has two
consequences: If mean house size, p, is reduced, tax bills for existing
residents per unit of g must rise. In addition, if preferences for g and
h are positively correlated, the effect of lowering p is a vote for a
lower g. A zoning rule that lowered p could not receive support.
conversely, an increase in p through zoning increases the tax base,
but also increases the amount of g voters will support. The "income
effect" of lower tax bills may offset the loss in utility that residents
(preferring a lower g) will sustain if a higher level of g is voted.
Current residents who fall below the median p before the zoning
change may accept a higher level of g in the future because of the tax
benefits of having neighbors with larger h.
These consequences can be described formally. Assume each
zoning choice, z, yields a unique mean housing size in the future, p'.
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Forexisting resident households, with given h and X, utility maxi-
mization with respect to p' requires:
=0 (2-30)
djlag'a,i'ax' a,.t'
(This requires that ög'/iiji' and exist and are continuous and
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whereis the elasticity of g' with respect to ii'. The sign of the
righthand side may be positive or negative, depending on whether
is less than or greater than unity. This result has a simple interpreta-
tion. If< 1, an increase in p' wifi allow current residents to acquire
more x and more g. If both g and x have positive marginal utility,
there would be unanimous support to increase pasmuch as possible.
(The amount by whichcould be increased would be determined by
the amount of vacant land available and the willingness of those
wanting large h to build in this jurisdiction.) Alternatively, if> 1,
the tax bill of current residents for any level of g will rise as prises,
and less x can be purchased; current residents can enjoy more g only
by giving up x. (It is possible that an increase in t' actually leaves all
current residents within their current budget opportunity locus. New
residents contribute less to the tax bill facing current residents than
they cost by voting a high g.)
While empirical results are far from conclusive on the nature of the
relationship between pandg, it is likely that at both extremes of the
income distribution, the elasticity is less than one. In a neighborhood
•of low-income households, the entry of somewhat wealthier ones
would not be likely to result in a vote for large increases in g. At the
high end of the income distribution, private services are often a
substitute for public services, and hence the elasticity of g with
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Figure 2-1 portrays the choices open to current residents before
and after the zoning change. Several budget lines denoting choices
between x and g for different households with different incomes are
portrayed. The x intercepts depend on utility functions, incomes,
and expectations, which together determine how large an h was
initially purchased by each household. Property tax financing implies
increasing tax burdens on households with larger h. The. original
problem of determining the vote on g amounts to analyzing the
transformation from f(h) to G(g).Foreach zoning decision that
increasesa higher g will be voted in the future. Each current
resident therefore confronts a set of points above his current budget
line. The locus of possible future voting outcomes on g, conditional
on the zoning policy, are denoted by the BC curves. Each point on
the BC curve for any current resident is derived from a prediction of
the future vote under an alternative zoning policy. (It is assumed




g°(h2) =. existing level of g

















Public-Sector Decisions and the Urban Housing Market 45
Thezoning strategy adopted will be given by finding the median
of current residents' preferences for ii',whereeach resident is
choosing a point along his BC locus. It will be shown below that
under certain assumptions the vote by current residents on g and
their vote on j.z'for the future can be represented by two distribu-
tions, one of which is a monotonic transformation of the other.
Since this implies no change in order, the zoning vote is therefore
given by the outcome preferred by the median voter from the
existing distribution of h. In this case, it is the tangent point D of the
indifference curve of the household, with h =medianof the existing
distribution f(h), to the locus AB2C2.Itshould be noted that there
are some residents with h below that of the median voter who are
better off after the zoning change than at present, though they
would have preferred a different zoning strategy than that selected.
The household with h1 is just indifferent to the outcomes before and
after the zoning change.
There are two steps in the analytic development of such a model
of zoning decisions. The first is to predict future votes on g (and
hence tax burdens) conditional on each f5(h). This is in essence what
was done in the preceding two sections. The second is to determine
how current residents, who control the zoning decision, rank these
possible outcomes. This involves specifying a utility function (or
functions if variation in tastes is to be included).
The principal difficulty in predicting future voting outcomes
conditional on any zisthat the density function describing housing
stocks is altered by the zoning action. Thus, even if the original f(h)
has a simple analytic shape—for example, normal—the new density
function will differ. Likewise, if the density function describing voter
preferences for g before the zoning change was normal, or had some
other known form, making determination of the median of G(g)
simple, it will not be so after the zoning change.
Thereisone special case in which the determination of g0
conditional on zisrelatively simple, namely, when all new entrants
have h above the new median. In this instance the new median g is
determined solely by the number of new entrants (but not the size of
h they occupy), and the shape of the original probability density
function IfN is the original community size and there are to






In this circumstance, current residents' preferences determine g'.
The more general case is that in which some new entrants prefer a46 Residential Location and Housing Choice
Depending on th
be complex, at 1
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preferences of entrants help determine the voting outcome, and there
is no substitute for calculating the new density function describing
preferences for g and finding its median. For virtually any interesting
specification of f(h) for current residents, and preferences for g by
incoming residents as related to h, the density function density G(g')
conditional on any z must be examined numerically. If future votes
on g can only be described numerically (or if g' and p.' are complex
functions in z), the transformation from h to z involved in describing
current residents' preferences for z will itself be complex and require
numerical examination.
One way in which the determination of z can be simplified is in
the specification of how existfrig voters form expectations regarding
future voting outcomes. Instead of deriving a solution for g' for every
p.' based on utility maximization voting behavior for all households
who will occupy the zone inthe future, existing households'
expectations might be represented in a more ad hoc fashion. In
essence this simplifies the specification of the transformation from z
to g', i.e., the description of the BC loci in Figure 2.1. If the BC loci
can be described analytically, it may be possible to get a reasonable
tractable statement of the transformation from h to z. One way to
achieve this type of simplification is to base expectations regarding
the future vote on g on the mean rather than the median of the
distribution describing preferences. Future tax burdens will also be
related to mean h in the future. If, further, preferences for g are
linearly related to h and andit is assumed that the household
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Existing households (with fixed h and A) would maximize U[g'(p.'),
x (p.), h, A] subject to p., which would determine g and x in the
future. Utility maximization would require:
U axag
(2-34)
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Depending on the choice of a utility function, Equation (2-34) may
be complex, at least a quadratic in p'. The simplest case is U =ain g







While this transformation from h to p' yields a complex density
function, it is monotonic since dp'/dh> 0 for all positive h. The
solution to the zoning strategy is therefore given by solving (2-35)
for the case where h =p.
CONCLUDINGOBSERVATtONS: MODELING
THE INTERACTIONS
Inthis study, I have taken up only one small part of the problem of
the interactions between the housing market and the public sector,
namely, ways of modeling the link from existing housing stocks in a
jurisdiction to voting on public-sector decisions. The principal moti-
vation for taking this partial-equilibrium approach is to abstract from
the very many complexities of modeling all the interdependencies in
the evolving process of housing market adjustments and household
relocation over time. Large-scale simulation models are probably
required to address many of the important general-equilibrium
aspects of urban development processes.
Implicit in the approach of this paper is an endorsement of the
importance of relatively fixed housing stocks and jurisdictional
boundaries. The NBER urban simulation model (Ingram, Kain, Ginn
1972) is one large-scale model organized around the housing stock
adaptation process. That model focuses on two sets of decisions over
time; household relocation choices and incremental housing stock
adaptations. In this study I suggest a third process to be modeled,
again in incremental fashion: public-sector decision making in juris-
dictions with essentially fixed boundaries and fixed stocks. Public-
sector outcomes would in turn be one argument in the household
relocation models, as well as affecting housing development processes
via the zoning process.
Since the models above consider only how one jurisdiction
behaves independent of events in all other jurisdictions, they are not48 Residential Location and Housing Choice
well suited to addressing problems of tax capitalization. While there
is a theoretical argument for public-sector decisions to be capitalized
into property values, the nature of tax capitalization in any jurisdic-
tion depends on outcomes in all other jurisdictions and on the
distribution of household preferences. Depending on the degree of
heterogeneity in tastes and households' willingness to move, housing
and public-sector opportunities in one jurisdiction may or may not
be regarded as a close substitute by residents of other jurisdictions.
The extent to which alternative sites are regarded as substitutes will
influence the extent to which particular decisions on public service
and tax levels in any one area are capitalized into housing values
there and in all other jurisdictions. An analytic solution of how
public-sector decisions affect property values is, in short, a general-
equilibrium problem as complex as that of determining how all
households might arrange themselves among diverse housing units in
different jurisdictions.
While the models in this chapter as an application of a standard
change-of-variable problem are formally quite simple, unfortunately.
the transformation from a probability distribution describing housing
stocks and tastes to one describing voter preferences generally proves
to be quite complex analytically. Use of a property tax as a financing
device results in a nonlinear budget constraint that virtually elim-
inates any hope of finding simple analytic results. The evaluation of
density functions as a basis for predicting voting outcomes must be
done numerically. However, if numerical evaluation is necessary,
virtually any utility function and density functions can be employed.
There are other ingredients to a descriptive model of local-govern-
ment decision making which should also be considered in extending
these models. There will be other interested parties besides local
residents who wifi affect outcomes. These include public-sector
employees, merchants, developers, landholders, and (possibly) the
outside sector. Objectives of these groups will differ. Public em-
ployees are likely to be concerned principally about employee
compensation; for some, thiswill be wages, while those in a
management role may be concerned about the size and growth of the
public budget. Some merchants may favor a strategy that maximizes
total community income, since this is likely to be a good proxy for
retail sales. Other retailers may prefer a strategy that maximizes per
capita income. Developers will prefer a strategy that maximizes the
rate of growth and, probably, one (at least in most metropolitan
areas) that allows more rather than fewer rental units, and high-
rather than low-density single-family development.
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important. Existing capital facilities, public budgets, and employee
numbers are important constraints in the short run. For example,
tenure and attrition rates in the labor force may be important
constraints. Existing sewer and other public facilities may be long-
lived capital stocks and a significant constraint on the types of
additional capital that can be put in place in the future. A fully
satisfactory model of local-government decisions must include these
complexities.
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